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This paper explores the role of social networks in determining the participation of 
Bolivian women in income-generating activities. The empirical analysis intends to 
explore the impact of this new social variable on the economic choices of women 
and its relative importance with respect to other individual characteristics, such as 
education or number of children in the household. The empirical framework 
defines social network as the average outcome of people living in the same 
neighborhood. Estimation results suggest that social networks are an effective 
channel through which women obtain access to salaried jobs, which are of higher 
quality than jobs as self-employers. In contrast, their male counterparts find a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect from social networks. When 
considering the sex of the contact, it is found that women in urban areas benefit 
from other women being employed, while in rural areas women benefit from the 
presence of more employed male workers. 
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Female labor market discrimination has important welfare implications in the developing world, 
where labor market earnings are the main component of households’ income, especially among 
poor families. Women are important contributors to total household income, and in many cases 
they carry the burden of raising their family alone: during the 1990-2004 period, between 20 to 
almost 50 percent of households were headed by women in developing countries,
1 earning 
between 25 to 30 percent less than men with similar education and labor market experience. 
Thus, women’s labor choices and outcomes have immediate effects that may make the difference 
between living in poverty or not. More generally, in less developed countries gender inequality is 
a widespread phenomenon that enhances poverty and decreases social mobility. 
Research on gender gaps in the labor market has traditionally sought explanations on the 
characteristics and preferences of individual workers or employers. One strand of the literature 
attributes the associations between workers’ sex and their labor market outcomes to sex 
differences in training, experience, age, marital status or career commitment. Others focus on 
employers’ preferences for workers of one sex over the other (taste discrimination) or on 
employers’ beliefs that workers of one sex or the other are more costly or less profitable to 
employ (statistical discrimination).
2 Even though measuring discrimination is not an easy task, 
the evidence is that, net of human capital characteristics and a variety of other control variables, 
men out-earn women, have better benefits, more on-the-job training and hold more complex jobs 
with more authority. Moreover, there is no evidence of a decrease in labor market unexplained 
gender differences as supporters of market-based theories would expect.
3  
Recent research in the fields of sociology and economics has shown that in addition to 
individual characteristics, social networks play an important role in the job matching process 
since a very important fraction of workers find jobs through friends and relatives.
4 Social 
interactions have externalities, in which the actions of a reference group affect an individual’s 
                                                 
1 World Bank (2006). Data for the 1990-2004 period; excludes countries with traditional societies where women 
play minor roles. 
2 A comprehensive survey of the literature can be found in Altonji and Blank (1999), while Moreno et al. (2004), 
Ñopo (2004), Núñez and Gutiérrez (2004) and Bravo et al. (2006) are examples of more recent empirical work on 
discrimination for Latin America.   
3 Ñopo (2004, 2007), Berhardt, Morris and Handcock (1995), and Arrow (1998). 
4 Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1973, 1995) suggest that in the United States more than 50 percent of all new jobs 
were found through friends, relatives, neighbors or occupational contacts rather than through formal means.   
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preferences.
5  If men and women use their social networks differently and if the networks have 
different characteristics, then the interactions with their peers would have different effects on 
their employment patterns and the quality of jobs they can access. This, in turn, could have 
important welfare effects on families who live in developing countries. 
Social network theory differs from traditional studies that assume that only individual 
characteristics influence individuals’ economic decisions: personal characteristics as well as their 
relationships and ties with other actors within the network matter. Hence, in the labor market 
context, the structure of individuals’ social networks turns out to be a key determinant of (i) who 
gets a job and who gets which job, (ii) how patterns of unemployment relate to gender or 
ethnicity, and (iii) the incentives that individuals have to educate themselves and to participate in 
the workforce (Jackson, 2003).   
Theoretical models of social networks distinguish two mechanisms through which social 
contacts impact on the functioning of the labor market. First, employers may reduce uncertainty 
about prospective worker’s productivity through referrals obtained from firms or workers. 
Second, worker’s connections disseminate job information within the supply side of the labor 
market through word-of-mouth communication.   In his seminal work Montgomery (1991) 
allows workers and firms to choose between formal and informal hiring channels, and concludes 
that workers who are well connected might fare better than workers with no social ties to high-
ability workers, even while holding numerous ties to low-ability workers.  More recently, models 
by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2002) and Calvó-Armengol (2004) allow workers to rely both 
on own search effort and on information exchange with their social circles to find jobs. They 
conclude that information passed from employed individuals to their unemployed acquaintances 
makes it more likely that these acquaintances will become employed, and that the duration and 
persistence of unemployment can be understood as social effects: the longer an individual is 
unemployed the more likely it is that her social environment is associated with unfavorable 
unemployment prospects.  Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) find that the likelihood of 
dropping out of the labor force is higher for individuals who have few acquaintances or whose 
social contacts have poor employment experience.  
Empirical studies suggest that social networks do have significant effects on employment 
outcomes. Case and Katz (1991) find a correlation between youth joblessness and the joblessness 
                                                 
5 Scheinkman (forthcoming 2008).  
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of neighbors. Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2002) find that social interactions can indeed 
explain the persistent correlations in patterns of unemployment in US cities. Weinberg et al. 
(2004) show that one standard deviation improvement in neighborhood social characteristics and 
in job proximity raises individuals’ hours worked by six per cent and four per cent on average, 
respectively. Similarly, Van Ham and Buchel (2006) find that those willing to work find it easier 
to do so if they live in regions with low regional unemployment rates. 
The empirical literature has also found evidence of differences in the characteristics of 
men’s and women’s social networks, which is the result of differences in the social-structural 
locations of women and men, and which in turn have effects on the access to information about 
job vacancies. Men are more likely to have wider-ranging networks consisting of work-centered 
networks (i.e., colleagues and co-workers), while women are more likely to have kin-centered 
networks.
6  While men are more likely to have higher-status social positions in communities, 
higher-status jobs, and fewer domestic responsibilities, women work in jobs with less socio-
economic status and professional responsibilities and have more domestic responsibilities, 
constraining their possibilities to form networks with people in high-status jobs, which creates 
network disadvantages for women.    
Empirical results suggest that female-dominated social networks are associated with 
lower-quality employment.  For instance, Mencken and Winfield (2000) find that women who 
found their jobs through male informal contacts were less likely to work in female-dominated 
occupations, which compared to non-female-dominated jobs offer lower wages, limited training, 
fewer opportunities for advancement, less autonomy, and more limited authority. Beggs and 
Hurlbert (1997) find that the gender of the informal contact affects the occupational status: 
women whose contacts are other women work in occupations with lower socioeconomic index. 
Finally, Petersen, Saporta and Seidel (2000) find that race and gender have a strong impact on 
the likelihood of having a second interview and on the increase in the salary offer.
7  
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of social networks in employment outcomes 
of Bolivian women vis-à-vis men, and to explore its relative importance with respect to 
individual characteristics, with a special concern for the quality of employment that they are able 
                                                 
6 Brass (1985), Hanson and Pratt (1991), McPherson and Smith-Lovin (1982, 1986). 
7 However, once they control for the referral method, sex and race effects disappear.  
  7
to obtain. By including social interactions in the analysis, we expand previous studies that only 
controlled for personal characteristics to explain women’s economic choices.  
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries of Latin America, with a per capita GDP of less 
than US$1,000 and with high levels of income inequality. Additionally, serious gender biases are 
prevalent in its labor market; for instance, between 1989 and 2002 unemployment and low-
quality jobs increased, yet women’s unemployment rates were consistently higher than men’s. 
And although female labor force participation rates have increased, the entry of more women 
into the Bolivian job market has not translated into quality jobs: by the end of the period 80 
percent of employed women worked in the informal sector, compared to 60 percent of employed 
men, and 75 percent of employed rural women did not receive any income for their work, which 
limits their possibilities to escape from poverty.
8 Furthermore, more than 50 percent of Bolivian 
women supply more than half of their family income, whilst the average hourly wage of women 
with college education is 40 percent below that of their male counterparts (Bravo and Zapata, 
2005). Notwithstanding these gender inequities, without the contribution of women to household 
income poverty rates would have been 11 percentage points higher in 2002.  
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents our methodological 
approach and identification strategy, followed by a section that describes the data used and 
summary statistics. Section 4 contains the estimation results, and the last section concludes with 
final remarks and policy recommendations. 
 
2. Empirical Framework 
 
2.1 Social Network Measures 
 
Empirical social network studies have typically defined a network along geographic or cultural 
proximity of a group of individuals. The empirical work has faced the difficult task of explaining 
if the observed correlation in the behavior of individuals who are physically or socially close is 
because they share the same sources of information or because they learn from one another’s 
behavior. The difference between the two of them is that the latter is really a social interaction, 
while the first simply reflects the fact that the group is affected by similar shocks (a more 
detailed explanation of the problems that can affect the empirical literature and the potential 
solutions will be explained in more detail in the following section). 
                                                 
8 See http://www.cepal.cl/mujer.  
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Furthermore, economic studies that define network effects as neighborhood effects 
recognize that the ties with one’s neighbors are weaker than the ties with friends or kin, and it is 
precisely this kind of ties that is more conductive to generating useful information about jobs. 
The literature on social networks acknowledges that a key characteristic determining the effect of 
job networks on finding employment is the strength of social ties. Granovetter (1973, 1995) 
argues that “weak” ties such us colleagues or acquaintances are a richer source of information 
about job openings than close family or friends (“strong” ties), because weak ties link various 
groups in social space, increasing the amount of non-redundant information. In contrast, strong 
ties connect similar people who are less likely to offer the job searcher information that she does 
not already have. In a more general context, strong and weak ties have different effects and 
different benefits. Strong ties are an important source for understanding and support, while weak 
ties provide access to miscellaneous resources.
9  
In this paper we use a reference group definition based on physical proximity as a 
measure of an individual’s social network. The underlying idea is that agents exchange 
information about job openings more frequently with people who live physically close.  Let each 
individual  i be a member of a peer group which is indexed by g  and is comprised of  g n  
individuals. We assume that each group is comprised by individuals that live in a common 
neighborhood, thus  {} g neighborhood = . We observe the (binary) outcome of each individual 
{ } , 0,1 ig y = , which represents the labor market outcome under study. We define the social 















− ∑  (1) 
Since yj,g is the individual’s labor market outcome (e.g., whether she is employed), then 
g i y , is the (left-out) group average outcome. 
Of course, social networks need not to be strictly geographic; networks also develop 
along other dimensions, such as gender. Straits (1998) finds that that men and women tend to use 
same-sex contacts in order to find to a job, so in order to obtain an additional measure of social 
networks we combine the gender social metric with our physical measure of networks. Thus, an 
                                                 
9 Hirsh et al. (1990), Cattell (2001), Granovetter (1973).  
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individual’s sex is considered as an additional indicator of social proximity, so that another 
















− ∑  (2) 
where individual i gives a positive weight w equal to 1 to every agent’s outcome  j  who 
belongs to her same sex, otherwise the outcome is assigned a weight equal to zero. Therefore, if 
social networks develop along gender lines, the employment outcomes of a female will be 
affected by the share of women peers with whom she can share information about job offers. 
 
2.2 Empirical Model 
 
Our econometric model follows closely the empirical models presented in the literature studying 
social interaction effects where the outcome of an individual is not only explained by her 
personal characteristics, but it is also influenced by the average outcome of her reference group, 
namely the social network variable.
10  
Each individual’s labor market outcome depends on a combination of individual-specific 
and group-specific factors. The individual-specific factors are comprised by observed  i x  (e.g., 
experience, marital status, number of children). Group-specific factors are partitioned into 
observed group-level characteristics  g z  (e.g., poverty rate in the neighborhood) and those that 
are unobserved,  g ζ  (e.g., employment opportunities in the neighborhood), and the average 
choice in the group  , ig y . Under these assumptions, the labor market outcome of each individual 
can be described by the following probability model,  
  ,, , ,, (1 | , , ) ( ) ig ig g ig g g ig ig yy y γ ζ == + + + Px z F x β z δ       (3) 
where social interactions are captured by the characteristics of the group  g z  and, the social 
network variable represented by the average outcome (employment rate) of the other members in 
the group  , ig y .  
                                                 
10 Case and Katz (2001), Sacerdote (2001), Bertrand et al. (2001).  
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Our model embeds three alternative hypothesis that can explain the correlation in the 
labor market outcomes of individuals who are in physical proximity to one another: endogenous 
interactions, exogenous or contextual interactions, and correlated effects (Manski 1993, 1999). In 
the presence of endogenous interactions the probability of an individual of obtaining a job 
increases with the fraction of her employed peers  , ig y . Consequently, in the presence of 
endogenous interactions, the coefficient accompanying the group’s average choice will be 
greater than zero ( 0 γ > ), implying that social contacts have a positive impact on labor market 
outcomes. This variable captures the idea that social contacts mediate propagation of rich and 
reliable information among individuals, thereby helping workers to find jobs, and employers to 
find employees (Calvó-Armengol, 2004). Consequently, interaction with more individuals that 
are strongly attached to the labor market (i.e., larger  , ig y ) leads to a reduction in the cost of 
finding information about job availability and/or to an increase the individual’s job market 
referrals, increasing the probability that the individual finds a job.  
In addition to the direct impact of social networks, we may expect that an individual’s 
outcome might be also influenced by the average personal characteristics of her reference group. 
For instance, an individual related to a cluster with a high socioeconomic status might increase 
her employment opportunities either because a member of the group may employ her, or because 
the member refers her to another employer. If this is the case, we are in the presence of 
contextual effects; hence, the effect is through the group characteristics and not through group 
outcomes.  
We may also believe that individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because 
they sort into neighborhoods or face similar institutional environments, what Manski calls 
correlated effects. For example, if the neighborhood where the individual and his group inhabit 
has better access to jobs, the individual’s likelihood of obtaining a job as well as the average 
employment rate of the group will increase.  
In order to draw meaningful public policy implications, it is very important to distinguish 
between these three effects. Moffitt (2001) argues that both endogenous and contextual effects 
imply that an individual’s outcome is influenced by her group; therefore, both represent real 
social interactions. Nevertheless, if endogenous effects are present then the aggregate impact of a 
policy intervention will be larger than the individual-level impact, giving rise to a “social  
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multiplier,” which will not happen if the social interaction is through contextual effects 
(Soetevent, 2006). In the context of this paper, a “social multiplier” occurs when an employed 
person raises the probability of being employed for the rest of the individuals on her group. 
Correlated effects, on the other hand, do not imply a social multiplier or that social groups 
matter. 
 
2.3 Identification Strategy 
 
Even if we have compelling evidence of correlations in the employment status of individuals 
who are in physical proximity to one another, we wish to know what explains such correlations. 
The presence of contextual and endogenous effects makes it difficult to disentangle the true 
impact of social networks on the employment opportunities of individuals. In this subsection we 
present our identification strategy and how it addresses these problems.  
The first problem that arises in the empirical study of social interactions is the reflection 
or simultaneity problem. As explained in Sacerdote (2001) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001), the 
reflection problem arises due to the fact that social interactions—endogenous and exogenous—
not only affect the individual’s outcomes but also impact the outcomes of other agents in the 
group simultaneously.  An econometrician who observes simply the final outcome may 
overcome the simultaneity problem by using an instrumental variables approach. The instrument 
that allows identification should be correlated with the social network variable but should not 
determine the labor market outcome of the individuals (Soetevent, 2006; Gaviria and Raphael, 
2001). 
The second major difficulty in identifying the effect of social interactions concerns the 
possibility that unobserved group or neighborhood effects exist. The presence of unobservable 
group effects can, if not accounted for, lead to spurious conclusions concerning the presence of 
social interactions. For instance, suppose some neighborhoods are affected by a positive shock 
and have more availability of jobs. If one calculates the correlation between an individual’s labor 
market outcome and the average neighborhood outcome, this correlation may be positive not 
because of any influence of social networks, but also because average neighborhood employment 
may be itself correlated with the availability of jobs within the neighborhood. Again, the 
presence of some non-observable group-specific component that is correlated with the  
  12
exogenous characteristics of the individuals will generate a non-zero expected value of the error 
term. 
Soetevent (2006) asserts that the common empirical approaches to solve or circumvent 
these problems rely on (i) the use of data in which agents are assigned in a random fashion to 
reference groups; (ii) the use of data where a fraction of agents within the group are given a 
treatment; (iii) the use of a functional form that explicitly accounts for inter-group differences by 
adding group-specific fixed effects and (iv) the use of instrumental variables. Given the non-
random nature of our data set, we rely on the last two strategies to attenuate the bias in the 
estimated effect of the social network and contextual effects. 
First, following the strategy presented in Bertrand, Erzo and Sendhil (2001), we regard 
unobserved group effects as fixed effects. We assume that the most important unobservable 
effects arise due to characteristics such as economic shocks in certain regions that influence the 
job availability in a group of nearby neighborhoods. For instance, a positive shock in an area will 
have the same effect on its neighborhoods. Therefore, we take advantage of geographic variation, 
allowing the inclusion of group-geographic fixed effects that include a number of neighborhoods 
which are very homogenous. More specifically, we include fixed effects at the municipal level, 
which are areas concentrating several similar neighborhoods. We therefore estimate 
  () ( ) ,, , ,, P1 | , , F ig ig g ig g a ig ig yy y γζ == + + + xzx β z δ  (4) 
where,  , ig x  is a vector of individual characteristics,  , ig y  is the average outcome observed by the 
other members of the group,  g z  is a vector containing average characteristics of the group 
members, and a ζ  are area fixed effects. The inclusion of these last two variables allows us to 
control for the presence of contextual effects and the primary sources of correlated effects, 
helping to attenuate the bias in the estimated effect the social network variable. 
As a second estimation strategy and to check the robustness of our results, we attempt to 
identify the social network effect finding an adequate instrumental variable in order to control for 
non-observable characteristics of the neighborhood and controlling for possible endogenous 
group formation (Moffitt, 2001). This strategy not only helps us to control for possible sources of 
correlated effects but also to overcome the reflection problem as we explain below. 
Following Bayer and Ross (2006), our strategy comprises a two-step procedure. In the 
first step, we will try to eliminate the correlation between the group component of the error term  
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and the individual attributes included in the regression by finding an adequate instrument to 
proxy the non-observable characteristics of the neighborhood. Let  g θ  be a variable that 
summarizes all of the group contribution to the individual outcome, where  , g ig g g y θ γζ =+ + z δ . 
For instance, a neighborhood that has a high employment rate, a positive economic environment, 
and inhabitants with high socioeconomic status can be considered a neighborhood 
() ,, , 1| , , ig ig g ig yy == Px z  of high quality, i.e., high  g θ . Bayer and Ross (2006) demonstrate that 
neighborhoods with increasing values of  g θ  are also ordered monotonically in terms of 
neighborhood housing prices  g p . This monotonic relationship implies that prices serve as a 
perfect control function for  g θ . Therefore, we can obtain a proxy for unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics from the average residual for each neighborhood arising from a housing price 
equation regression.  
  ,, , , ig ig g ig ig p yv γ =+ + + H φ z δ  (5) 
where  , ig H  is a vector of housing unit attributes that absorbs any aspect of prices explained by 
housing characteristics. Once we estimate equation (5) we can obtain an estimated control 
function for the unobservable neighborhood attributes ( g ζˆ )by  averaging the unexplained portion 
of house prices for each neighborhood. Then, we can replace it in equation (3) obtaining,  
 
  () ( ) g g g i g i g g i g i g i y y y ζ γ ˆ , , | 1 , , , , , + + + = = δ z β x F z x P  (6) 
The second part of the strategy is designed to address the likely correlation of the error term that 
arises from the non-random sorting of household into neighborhoods or the presence of 
unobservable individual characteristics. As shown in Bayer and Ross (2006), the presence of 
non-random sorting generally will imply correlation between neighborhood attributes ( , , g ig y z  
and  g ζˆ ) and the error term. To overcome this problem, they suggest using as an instrument the 
average values of observed neighborhood characteristics for individuals with the same 
observable characteristics. The proposed instruments are predictive of location because similar 
individuals make similar neighborhood choices, and they are not correlated to individual’s  
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unobservable preferences because they have been constructed using observable characteristics 
which are assumed to be uncorrelated with non-observable individual variables. 
Moreover, our second estimation strategy also deals with the simultaneity or reflection 
problem. As in Gaviria and Raphael (2001), our instrument for the social network is correlated 
with this variable, but since it is only a good predictor for the individual’s location, it does not 
impact labor market outcomes. Therefore, this identification strategy will allow us to draw 
conclusions about the extent of the effects of social network effects. 
The two empirical identification strategies are intended to isolate endogenous effects 
from exogenous and correlated effects. However, it is still possible that we cannot identify the 
sole effects of social networks, and in that case our results will overstate their role. This caveat 
notwithstanding, in this case our results will still be robust to the presence of social interactions 
since both strategies are particularly satisfactory at removing correlated effects (Bayer and Ross, 
2006). Therefore, the statistical significance of the social network variable still stresses the 
importance of group effects in labor market outcomes beyond individual characteristics. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
This study uses two sources of information. First, individual-level data are obtained from the 
2001 round of Bolivia’s national household survey (MECOVI), which is administered by the 
National Statistical Institute (INE) during the months of November and December of each year. 
MECOVI is a nationally representative survey that collects detailed data on the characteristics of 
25,166 individuals and 5,845 households. These data allowed us to obtain relevant information 
on individual’s labor market outcomes, individual characteristics, household’s composition and 
dwellings characteristics. Additionally, we were able to identify the neighborhood where each 
individual lives.  
The MECOVI survey is not representative at the neighborhood level, therefore, we use 
the Bolivian census to obtain our proposed measure of social networks and several group 
characteristics. The census was conducted in August of 2001 and contains basic information on 
households, individual and employment characteristics of each member of the household.   
According to the census, Bolivia has a population of 8,274,325 people divided into nine 
departments and 314 municipal governments. While the MECOVI covers all nine departments, it 
only includes 211 municipal governments; therefore, our final database contains only those  
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municipalities covered by both the census and the MECOVI. The final database contains 
individuals residing in 576 neighborhoods around the country. 
There are two benefits of using data from both, the household survey and the census. 
First, the MECOVI survey contains a richer set of household characteristics and employment 
outcomes, in contrast to the census where the number of variables is limited. Second, the census 
contains data that is representative at the neighborhood level, providing us with information 
about the group that surrounds each individual, which cannot be obtained from the MECOVI 
survey. 
Our analysis is based on data for 1,679 females and 2,299 males, aged 25-60 years old. 
We restrict our sample to this range of age since we do not want our results to be affected by the 
schooling or retirement decisions. In our sample, by age 25 the male participation rate is over 90 
percent, while the female rate is above 65 percent. This result remains true for the 25-60 year-old 
range. 
In Bolivia’s labor market there are important differences between urban and rural areas. 
In rural regions, agriculture is one of the most important activities. In particular, subsistence 
agriculture, which does not demand high skill labor, constitutes a significant fraction of the work 
performed in rural areas. As a result, the participation and employment rates in this area are 
typically high (see Table 1). Even though nearly all rural women and men are employed (over 98 
percent), about 72.3 percent of female workers and 35.3 percent of male workers are non-
remunerated. Among remunerated workers, 79 percent of men work as self-employers and 77 
percent of women do so. Conversely, in urban areas only 18.1 percent of women and 11.0 
percent of men perform non-remunerated activities. Most men who work for pay are wage 
workers (59 percent), whereas women are mostly self-employed (55 percent).
11 
Table 2 summarizes selected characteristics of wage/salary workers and independent 
workers. We can see that wage workers earn more than self-employed, both in urban and rural 
areas (above 78 percent). Men receive higher hourly earnings than women, except among the 
self-employed in rural areas. Rural self-employed receive the same hourly income independently 
of their sex, yet both the hourly and monthly income of this group of workers is very low 
compared to that of their wage/salary counterparts. Furthermore, 32 percent of wage workers are 
                                                 
11 Since a very small fraction of the population works as an employer we perform our analysis considering only 
wage/salary workers and independent workers.  
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affiliated with private social security (AFP), while only 1.8 percent of self-employed workers 
are. Women wage workers, however, are affiliated at a higher percentage than men wage 
workers.  
Wage workers are more educated than self-employed. In particular, female wage workers 
are more educated than men, but this difference does not translate into higher or even equal 
earnings. The self-employed are older and work fewer hours than wage workers. Moreover, in 
rural areas those workers are mostly indigenous. Low wages, low affiliation with social security 
and low levels of education of workers suggest that in Bolivia self-employment is a low quality 
job compared to wage/salary work.  
Selected characteristics describing the neighborhoods in which our sample of individuals 
lives are presented in Table 3. Neighborhoods in urban areas contain a low concentration of 
indigenous population (28 percent), and on average 45 percent of individual living in urban 
neighborhoods live in poverty.
12  In contrast, neighborhoods in rural areas contain a high 
proportion of indigenous people (67 percent) and strikingly, on average 90 percent of individuals 
in rural neighborhoods are poor according to the Basic Unsatisfied Needs Index.  
Regarding labor market characteristics, both rural and urban neighborhoods have the 
same fraction of employed people between 25 and 60 years old (67 percent). However, there are 
important differences between neighborhoods in rural areas, as implied by the large standard 
deviation. Important gender differences, also between urban and rural areas arise, when the share 
of people working as wage/salary workers is considered. In urban area neighborhoods, on 
average, about 33 percent of people aged 25 to 60 works as a wage/salary worker, whereas only 
12 percent of people in rural neighborhoods work as wage workers. In both rural and urban 
neighborhoods, a smaller share of women have salaried employment.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section we present the results of estimating equation (4) using a normal probability model 
for the two different labor market outcomes under study and the instrumental variables model 
using equation (6). We are interested in exploring the role of social networks in (i) the 
probability of participating in the labor market vs. not participating in the labor market, and  (ii) 
the probability of working in a wage/salary job vs. working in an independent (self-employed) 
                                                 
12 This poverty rate was calculated using the Basic Unsatisfied Needs approach at the neighborhood level.  
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job. We perform all the estimations using observations for women and men separately. 
Additionally, due to the differences between the urban and rural labor markets acknowledged in 
the previous section we also report these results separately for these two areas.  
The social network variable is calculated using equation (1). When the individual 
outcome is labor force participation, we consider the social network as the share of individuals in 
the neighborhood that are employed. We consider only employed individuals because 
unemployed ones will not be an effective information channel, since it is likely that if they have 
information about a job opening they will keep it for themselves. Moreover, a larger share of 
employed individuals may encourage people to participate in the labor market, while high 
unemployment rates may have the opposite effect. When the relevant outcome is wage/salary 
worker vis-à-vis self-employed, the social network variable is the share of individuals in the 
neighborhood who are wage workers.  
In a separate set of regressions, we compute the social network variable considering the 
sex of the contacts within the neighborhood in order to test the hypothesis that social networks 
are formed along gender lines. Hence, we include the average outcome of females and males in 
the neighborhood as separate regressors. If women (men) tend to have same-sex contacts then, 
the average outcome of women (men) will have a significant and positive effect on the same-sex 
individual’s outcome. On the other hand, if social networks of women include both men and 
women, then both employed men and women will experience a positive impact. 
We also control for personal characteristics, households characteristics and include 
relevant variables to capture the impact of contextual effects. The vector of individual 
characteristics includes labor market experience (proxied by age), education of the individual, a 
dummy if the individual is a household head,  a dummy if the individual is married and a dummy 
if she belongs to an indigenous group. Household demographic composition is captured by 
including variables for the number of young children (less than 6 years old), youngsters (between 
6 and 18 years old), adults (between 19 and 60 years old) and elderly (60 years or older) in the 
household. To capture exogenous effects, we control for the poverty of the neighborhood 
measured as the share of inhabitants with unsatisfied basic needs in education, housing and 
health. We also include the share of indigenous inhabitants in the neighborhood and the share of 
people between 25 and 60 years old in the neighborhood that have secondary education or more  
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years of education. Finally, we include municipal fixed effects to control for neighborhood 
unobservables.  
Tables 5 to 8 present our results. Odd-numbered columns contain the results for the 
probability model with municipality fixed effects, and the instrumental variable estimations are 
displayed in even-numbered columns.  
 




Tables 5 and 6 report the results of estimating a probability model for female labor market 
participation in urban and rural areas, respectively. The variables controlling for individual 
characteristics display the expected signs. Being a household head increases the probability of 
labor market participation, both in urban and rural areas. Experience (proxy by age) has a 
positive but decreasing effect on labor market participation. In urban areas having more 
education increases the likelihood of joining the labor market, but being married decreases it. 
Both of these effects are not significant in rural areas.  
The results of the probability model of working as a wage/salary worker for women in 
urban and rural areas are presented as well in Tables 5 and 6. Regarding personal characteristics, 
we find that in urban and rural areas more educated women have more likelihood of performing 
wage/salary work. In urban areas marriage and the presence of small children has a negative 
effect on the probability of being a wage worker, implying that in urban areas less educated 
married women living with small children are more likely to be independent workers.  
 
Male Sample 
In urban areas being a household head, indigenous and having small children increases the 
probability of participating in the labor market. Experience has a non-linear effect, as in the 
female sample. None of these variables are significant in the rural sample, which comes as no 
surprise since almost all rural men are participating in the labor market. 
In urban and rural areas better-educated men are more likely to be wage/salary workers. 
In contrast to women, in urban areas neither the marital status nor the family composition are 
important variables at the time of explaining the probability of having a salaried job. On the 
contrary, in rural areas married men have a higher probability of self-employment.   
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After controlling for area fixed-effects and contextual characteristics, we find that the social 
network (i.e., the fraction of employed inhabitants in the neighborhood) influences positively 
though not significantly the probability of participating in the labor market both in rural and 
urban areas (Table 5 and 6). This result remains when we consider the fraction of women and 
men employed separately.  
On the other hand, the results in Tables 5 and 6 also indicate that the social network—
measured as the fraction of wage/salary workers in the neighborhood—has a positive effect on 
the probability of holding this type of job, both in urban and rural areas. Furthermore, when we 
consider the sex of the contact on the definition of the social network we find that urban females 
benefit from other women being employed as wage workers, while the share of male wage 
workers in their neighborhood has a not statistically significant effect. In contrast, in rural areas 
the probability of having a salary work for a woman increases as the share of men wage workers 
increases, whereas the percentage of women does not have a statistically significant effect.  
Regarding contextual effects, we find that as the percentage of poverty increases the 
percentage of women participating in the labor market decreases, probably reflecting the fact that 
women living in poor households cannot buy domestic services that allow them to have more 
time to participate in the labor market. We also found a negative correlation between the share of 
people with completed high school education completed in the neighborhood and the probability 
of participating in the labor market. If high levels of education are correlated with higher levels 
of income it is possible that the participation of women has an inverted “U” shape in income, 
with low levels of participation at low levels of income and also with low levels of participation 
at higher income levels. 
In rural areas, as the fraction of indigenous population in the neighborhood increases the 
probability of participating in the labor market is higher. The percentage of indigenous 
population is also positive correlated with the likelihood of being self-employed. A possible 
explanation is that the concentration of indigenous population may itself function as a type of 
network, and therefore a larger share of indigenous neighbors may imply a larger network in 
which to obtain information about possible job prospects (see Contreras, Kruger and Zapata,   
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2006). The strength of this correlation is higher—both in magnitude and statistical 




Social networks have a positive and significant effect on the probability that urban men 
participate on the labor market (Table 7). Furthermore, when we consider the fraction of women 
and men employed separately we found that men who live in neighborhoods with a larger 
fraction of employed men have a higher likelihood of participating in the labor market, while the 
percentage of employed women is not a statistically significant variable for this outcome. 
When we explore the impact of social networks on the probability of having a 
wage/salary job we find that social networks have a positive effect on the probability that rural 
men hold this type of job. When we consider the sex of the contact the results indicate that men 
in both rural and urban areas benefit from having men neighbors employed as wage workers; 
nevertheless, this result loses its statistical significance once we use instrumental variables in 
order to control for the quality of the neighborhood and the possibility of sorting. Therefore, 
caution should be taken when looking as this result.  
The only statistically significant contextual effect is the percentage of indigenous 
population in rural areas, which increases the probability of being self-employed.  
 
4.3 Marginal Effects  
 
We depict the probability of having a wage/salary job for a person with average values on all 
variables but changing the value of her social network (see Figure 1). Looking at the left panel in 
Figure 1 we can see that slight increments in the share of salaried workers in the neighborhood 
increases dramatically the probability of a women  to find a job as a wage/salary worker. In 
contrast, men seem to obtain only small benefits from social contacts. In rural areas, the benefits 
of social networks are only slightly larger for women than for men. 
Figure 2 depicts the probability of working as a wage/salary worker as the share of male 
and female wage/salary workers changes, keeping all other variables at their average levels. The 
results indicate that in urban areas, women benefit the most from same-sex contacts. This is 
evident when looking at the first panel in Figure 2, which shows the probability of a women 
working as a wage worker increases importantly only when the share of same-sex wage workers 
increases within the neighborhood.  
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Females living in rural areas benefit from both male and female social networks. As 
shown in the third panel in Figure 2, the probability that a female urban worker is a wage/salary 
worker increases with the share of both, male and female employed wage/salary workers. In 
contrast, the probability that a male works as a wage/salary worker increases only as the share of 
same-sex wage workers increases, whereas females in urban areas experience a negative but 
insignificant effect. 
Men also benefit importantly from other men being salaried workers in their 
neighborhood, but they present a small but negative effect from the share of working females 
(see second panel in Figure 2).  
 
4.4 Intensity of the Social Network Effect among Different Populations  
 
Previous literature indicates that the intensity of use of social networks varies among different 
demographic groups. Elliot (1999) found that workers with less education and located in high 
poverty rate neighborhoods are more likely to use informal contacts. In contrast, according to 
Ioannides and Loury (2004) more educated job seekers are less likely to use friends or relatives 
to find a job.  
We are interested in exploring if low skill men and women use social networks with more 
or less intensity than the rest of the population. The results in Table 9 indicate that men and 
women with incomplete primary education use social networks more intensively to find a 
wage/salary job, both in urban and rural areas. This result is consistent with previous findings 
that labor market referrals are used less intensively by individuals with higher levels of education 
(Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2004; Bayer and Ross, 2006). 
 
5. Final Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
Traditionally, when studying labor market outcomes only individual characteristics have been 
considered, ignoring the fact that individuals are influenced by their surroundings. One of the 
main contributions of this paper is to provide new evidence on the role that social networks play 
in determining various employment outcomes in Bolivia. We find evidence that social networks 
are an effective channel through which men and women obtain access to higher quality jobs 
(wage/salary work vis á vis self-employed). Furthermore, when we consider the sex of the 
contact we find that in urban areas men and women tend to use same sex contacts to find a job as  
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a salaried worker. This finding suggests that social contacts have positive externality effects that 
can potentially increase the welfare of Bolivian workers, as these contacts are useful in finding 
better quality jobs. 
The policy implications of these findings are threefold. First, the analysis of labor market 
discrimination should consider the effects of social networks on labor market outcomes. Not 
considering this variable may lead to interpreting several labor market outcomes such us labor 
market segregation and wage differentials as discrimination when these outcomes may in fact be 
the result, to some extent, of the mechanisms that men and women use to find a job.  
Second, even though the percentage of women working as salaried workers impacts 
positively on the probability of women’s obtaining a salaried job in urban areas, only 41.9 
percent of women women actually have this type of job, compared to 59.4 percent of men.  
Affirmative action policies oriented to increase the participation of women in salaried jobs are 
therefore needed to improve the working conditions of women. Furthermore, such policies will 
have spillover effects, since they will benefit not only women who are appointed to those jobs 
but also women in their surroundings through the multiplier effect of the social network. In rural 
areas, however, women benefit more from the presence of male salaried workers. Consequently, 
the latter policy implications do not hold in rural areas. 
Finally, social networks in Bolivia are used to find jobs as salary workers vis á vis self-
employment. Therefore, we can infer that networks are used by employers to eliminate part of 
the asymmetry of information they have about prospective employees and for future employees 
to obtain information about job openings. Policies oriented to reduce these asymmetries of 
information, such us state-run job agencies, might simplify and accelerate the job-search process. 
In Bolivia, there is scarce evidence about the determinants of female labor force 
participation and the probability of obtaining a salaried job. In line with the international 
evidence, we find that marriage (urban sample) and having small children (rural sample) impact 
negatively on the probability of participating in the labor market. In contrast, there is weak 
evidence that marriage increases the probability that men participate in the labor market, as does 
having small children in the household. These results suggest that women bear the main 
responsibility for domestic and child care activities, while men are primarily responsible for 
market-oriented activities.  Therefore, policies oriented to increase female labor force 
participation and/or the percentage of women who hold quality jobs need to be accompanied by  
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measures that help women take care of the domestic activities within their home, such as day 
care services for small children. 
The role of education is a robust result. Education is correlated with the probability to 
find a wage/salary job for both men and women, in urban and rural areas. This result highlights 
the importance of public policy programs oriented to increase the levels of education. This is 
particularly important for Bolivian women, who have much less education than their male 
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Table 1. Employment Characteristics by Gender, 2001 
(25-60 years old) 
 
   Men  Women  Total 
Labor force participation rate (%)        
Urban  94.7 73.3 83.4 
Rural  98.9 78.4 88.6 
Total  96.2 75.0 85.2 
Employed  (%)     
Urban  92.4 89.7 91.2 
Rural  99.4 98.6 99.1 
Total  95.6 93.5 94.7 
UNPAID WORKERS  (%)     
Urban  11.0 18.1 14.2 
Rural  35.3 72.3 51.6 
Total  22.3 42.8 31.4 
PAID WORKERS     
Wage workers (%) (1)     
Urban  59.4 41.9 51.8 
Rural  18.5 20.7 19.1 
Total  44.1 37.8 41.7 
Self-employment (%) (1)     
Urban  35.4 55.1 44.0 
Rural  79.0 77.0 78.5 
Total  51.8 59.4 54.6 
Works as an Employer (%) (1)     
Urban  5.2 3.0 4.2 
Rural  2.5 2.3 2.4 
Total  4.1 2.8 3.7 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MECOVI 2001.   
(1) As a percentage of paid workers.  
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Table 2. Selected Individual Characteristics by Gender 
(25-60 years old) 
 
  Wage Worker   Self-Employed 
   Men  Women  Total  Men  Women  Total 
Log Hourly Earnings             
   Rural  1.2  1.0  1.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
   Urban  1.6  1.5  1.6  1.3  0.9  1.1 
   Total  1.5  1.5  1.5  0.7  0.7  0.7 
Labor earnings (US$/month)           
   Rural  121.6  84.2  111.9  81.2  83.6  81.7 
   Urban  209.6  171.3  196.0  162.6  85.0  119.9 
   Total  195.7  161.9  184.2  116.9  84.6  103.4 
Hours a week             
   Rural  47.3  39.2  45.2 42.3  36.9  41.1 
   Urban  50.3  39.4  46.5  47.8  40.2  43.6 
   Total  49.9  39.4  46.3 44.7  39.4  42.5 
Affiliation with social security (%)           
   Rural  14.8  29.8  18.5  0.6  0.0  0.4 
   Urban  32.4  35.3  33.4  4.2  2.1  3.1 
   Total  29.3  34.7  31.1  2.0  1.5  1.8 
Age            
   Rural  38  36  37  42  42  42 
   Urban  38  37  37  40  41  40 
   Total  38  37  37  41  41  41 
Education (in years)             
   Rural  7.4  8.5  7.7  4.8  3.2  4.4 
   Urban  10.7  11.6  11.0  9.2  6.5  7.7 
   Total  10.2  11.3  10.6  6.7  5.6  6.3 
Indigenous (%)             
   Rural  44.0  39.9  42.9 76.9  76.0  76.7 
   Urban  28.0  14.4  23.2  33.5  41.6  37.9 
   Total  30.5  17.1  26.0 58.3  50.3  55.1 
            
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MECOVI 2001.         




Table 3. Selected Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
   Urban  Rural  Total 







           
Percent-indigenous  0.28 0.22 0.67 0.37 0.40 0.33 
Percent-poverty  0.45 0.35 0.90 0.17 0.59 0.37 
Average number of children under 6 
years of age in the household  0.83 0.23 1.09 0.43 0.91 0.33 
Average number of children aged 6 to 
18 in the household  1.76 0.39 1.95 0.64 1.82 0.49 
        
Average  employed  workers    0.67 0.05 0.67 0.20 0.67 0.12 
Average employed female workers   0.54  0.07  0.47  0.30  0.51  0.18 
Average employed male workers   0.81  0.04  0.86  0.17  0.83  0.10 
Average  wage/salary  workers    0.33 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.13 
Average  female  wage/salary  workers  0.23 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.12 
Average  male  wage/salary  workers    0.44 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.17 
        
Population  25  to  60  years  old  1301 323 163 208 854 624 
                    
 





Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Average wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0280*** 0.0071*** 0.0018 0.0038*
(0.0052) (0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0019)
Average female wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0221*** 0.0017 -0.0094* -0.0031
(0.0046) (0.0016) (0.0049) (0.0022)
Average male wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0033 0.0051* 0.0068* 0.0038***
(0.0042) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0011)
Observations 1327 517 1692 1535 1327 517 1692 1535
Weighted estimates. Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4. Summary of the effect of social networks on the probability of working as a wage/salary worker
(change in the probability for a change in the social network variable)






Table 5. Labor Market Outcomes Regressions, 
Female Urban Sample 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV
Average employment in the 
neighborhood 0.0012 0.0205
(0.0029) (0.0223)
Average female employment in 
the neighborhood 0.0040 0.0769
(0.0024) (0.0524)
Average male employment in 
the neighborhood -0.0052 -0.0640
(0.0042) (0.0580)
Average wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood 0.0280*** 0.0631**
(0.0052) (0.0320)
Average female wage/salary 
workers in the neighborhood 0.0221*** 0.1060***
(0.0046) (0.0371)
Average male wage/salary 
workers in the neighborhood 0.0033 -0.0078
(0.0042) (0.0293)
Percent-indigenous 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0040 0.0003 -0.0132 0.0028* -0.0073
(0.0008) (0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0064) (0.0019) (0.0128) (0.0017) (0.0120)
Percent-poverty -0.0018** -0.0085* -0.0016* -0.0112** -0.0004 -0.0047 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0044) (0.0009) (0.0051) (0.0012) (0.0067) (0.0013) (0.0083)
Share of people with high-
school education or more -0.0034** 0.0049 -0.0040** -0.0043 -0.0060** -0.0087 -0.0051* -0.0252*
(0.0015) (0.0060) (0.0016) (0.0084) (0.0025) (0.0133) (0.0027) (0.0144)
Household head 0.0849*** 0.1159*** 0.0838*** 0.1078*** -0.0313 -0.0471 -0.0342 -0.0315
(0.0291) (0.0327) (0.0291) (0.0398) (0.0605) (0.0782) (0.0592) (0.0783)
Age 0.0626*** 0.0633*** 0.0632*** 0.0657*** -0.0231 -0.0222 -0.0227 -0.0241
(0.0096) (0.0124) (0.0097) (0.0144) (0.0184) (0.0281) (0.0189) (0.0282)
Age2 -0.0000*** -0.0008*** -0.0000*** -0.0008*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Education 0.0081*** 0.0149* 0.0079*** 0.0031 0.0387*** 0.0131 0.0387*** 0.0166
(0.0027) (0.0082) (0.0027) (0.0158) (0.0045) (0.0148) (0.0044) (0.0149)
Married -0.1110*** -0.0850** -0.1123*** -0.1031** -0.2005*** -0.2305*** -0.1881*** -0.2006**
(0.0254) (0.0338) (0.0253) (0.0406) (0.0590) (0.0799) (0.0582) (0.0824)
Indigenous 0.0488 -0.0031 0.0492 0.0123 -0.0299 0.5063*** -0.0311 0.5027***
(0.0338) (0.1181) (0.0335) (0.1321) (0.0521) (0.1896) (0.0504) (0.1923)
HH members under 6 years of 
age -0.0101 -0.0265 -0.0095 -0.0038 -0.0329* 0.0156 -0.0354* -0.0104
(0.0120) (0.0168) (0.0118) (0.0292) (0.0197) (0.0353) (0.0199) (0.0394)
HH members aged between 6 to 
18 -0.0135 -0.0206 -0.0131 0.0032 0.0120 0.0350 0.0171 0.0303
(0.0088) (0.0139) (0.0088) (0.0276) (0.0151) (0.0305) (0.0151) (0.0317)
HH members 60 years old or 
older 0.0061 0.0139 0.0048 0.0021 0.0231 0.0099 0.0360 -0.0461
(0.0256) (0.0289) (0.0255) (0.0346) (0.0427) (0.0631) (0.0430) (0.0746)
Observations 2299 2299 2299 2299 1327 1327 1327 1327
Results express marginal probabilities. Weighted estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Not shown: Municipality fixed effects.
Labor force participation Wage work
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Table 6. Labor Market Outcomes Regressions, 
Female Rural Sample 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE
Average employment in the neighborhood 0.0011
(0.0011)
Average female employment in the 
neighborhood 0.0011
(0.0008)
Average male employment in the 
neighborhood -0.0004
(0.0014)
Average wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0071***
(0.0019)
Average female wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood 0.0017
(0.0016)
Average male wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0051**
(0.0022)
Percent-indigenous 0.0019*** 0.0017*** -0.0024*** -0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Percent-poverty 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Share of people with high-school 
education or more -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0035 -0.0036
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0029)
Household head 0.1480*** 0.1488*** -0.0244 -0.0193
(0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0606) (0.0585)
Age 0.0272** 0.0275** -0.0090 -0.0071
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0196) (0.0194)
Age2 -0.0000** -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Education 0.0061 0.0056 0.0283*** 0.0275***
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0055)
Married -0.0253 -0.0218 0.0166 0.0215
(0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0518) (0.0511)
Indigenous 0.0517 0.0456 -0.0028 -0.0072
(0.0411) (0.0404) (0.0571) (0.0569)
HH members under 6 years of age -0.0246* -0.0244* 0.0074 0.0047
(0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0242) (0.0247)
HH members aged between 6 to 18 -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0232* -0.0228*
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0130) (0.0128)
HH members 60 years old or older 0.0356 0.0325 -0.0843* -0.0834*
(0.0394) (0.0386) (0.0463) (0.0441)
Observations 1679 1679 517 517
Results express marginal probabilities. Weighted estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Not shown: Municipality fixed effects.





Table 7. Labor Market Outcomes Regressions, 
Male Urban Sample 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV
Average employment in the 
neighborhood 0.0025* 0.0152**
(0.0015) (0.0066)
Average female employment in 
the neighborhood -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0042)
Average male employment in 
the neighborhood 0.0032** 0.0198***
(0.0013) (0.0064)
Average wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood 0.0018 0.0645
(0.0040) (0.0418)
Average female wage/salary 
workers in the neighborhood -0.0094* 0.0177
(0.0049) (0.0368)
Average male wage/salary 
workers in the neighborhood 0.0068** 0.0278
(0.0033) (0.0305)
Percent-indigenous 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 0.0001 0.0092 -0.0001 0.0048
(0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0075) (0.0013) (0.0071)
Percent-poverty -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0042 -0.0002 -0.0034
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0055)
Share of people with high-
school education or more 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0003 0.0014 0.0011 -0.0096 0.0046* -0.0049
(0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0108) (0.0027) (0.0119)
Household head 0.0454** 0.0499* 0.0474** 0.0546** -0.0295 -0.0137 -0.0235 -0.0011
(0.0189) (0.0256) (0.0193) (0.0259) (0.0534) (0.0626) (0.0539) (0.0709)
Age 0.0083*** 0.0108*** 0.0085*** 0.0115*** -0.0415*** -0.0397** -0.0415*** -0.0419**
(0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0154) (0.0174) (0.0156) (0.0174)
Age2 -0.0000*** -0.0002*** -0.0000*** -0.0002*** 0.0000** 0.0004* 0.0000** 0.0004**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Education -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0126*** 0.0048 0.0126*** 0.0045
(0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0137) (0.0037) (0.0145)
Married 0.0269** 0.0254 0.0252** 0.0214 0.0043 0.0251 0.0079 0.0087
(0.0107) (0.0158) (0.0106) (0.0149) (0.0497) (0.0610) (0.0496) (0.0567)
Indigenous 0.0193*** 0.0568*** 0.0193*** 0.0467*** 0.0178 0.0909 0.0167 0.1054
(0.0060) (0.0191) (0.0058) (0.0176) (0.0392) (0.1420) (0.0395) (0.1407)
HH members under 6 years of 
age 0.0101** 0.0162*** 0.0099** 0.0140** 0.0202 0.0320 0.0223 0.0352
(0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0179) (0.0212) (0.0180) (0.0270)
HH members aged between 6 to 
18 0.0028 0.0073* 0.0022 0.0046 0.0097 0.0118 0.0090 0.0148
(0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0115) (0.0161) (0.0115) (0.0167)
HH members 60 years old or 
older 0.0018 -0.0024 0.0018 0.0015 -0.0254 -0.0530 -0.0124 -0.0335
(0.0063) (0.0104) (0.0061) (0.0101) (0.0467) (0.0605) (0.0468) (0.0747)
Observations 2034 2034 2034 2034 1692 1692 1692 1692
Results express marginal probabilities. Weighted estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Not shown: Municipality fixed effects.







Table 8. Labor Market Outcomes Regressions, 
Male Rural Sample 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE
Average employment in the neighborhood -0.0000
(0.0000)
Average female employment in the 
neighborhood -0.0000
(0.0000)
Average male employment in the 
neighborhood 0.0000
(0.0000)
Average wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0038*
(0.0019)
Average female wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood -0.0031
(0.0022)
Average male wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0038***
(0.0011)
Percent-indigenous -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0011* -0.0009*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Percent-poverty 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0014
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Share of people with high-school 
education or more -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0004
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0008)
Household head 0.0002 0.0000 -0.1158* -0.0974
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0681) (0.0692)
Age 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0060 -0.0052
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0099) (0.0101)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Education -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0193*** 0.0194***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Married -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.1225** -0.1239**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0526) (0.0541)
Indigenous 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0488 -0.0525
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0436) (0.0443)
HH members under 6 years of age -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0016 0.0028
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0111) (0.0111)
HH members aged between 6 to 18 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0097
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0084) (0.0085)
HH members 60 years old or older -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0619 -0.0677
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0464) (0.0471)
Observations 1681 1681 1535 1535
Results express marginal probabilities. Weighted estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Not shown: Municipality fixed effects.




Table 9. Different Use of Networks among Population with Complete Primary Education 
vs. Population with Incomplete Primary Education 
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Dependent variable: Labor market participation
Average employed workers in the 
neighborhoods 0.0003 0.0004 0.0031** -0.0000
(0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0000)
Average employed workers in the 
neighborhood*incomplete primary==1 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Average female employed  in the 
neighborhood 0.0033 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Average female employed in the 
neighborhood*incomplete primary==1 0.0006 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0000
(0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0000)
Average male employed  in the 
neighborhood -0.0056 -0.0006 0.0033** 0.0000
(0.0042) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0000)
Average male employed in the 
neighborhood*incomplete primary==1 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0000)
Dependent variable: Wage/salary work
Average wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood 0.0232*** 0.0032 0.0003 0.0024
(0.0048) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0022)
Average wage/salary workers in the 
neighborhood*incomplete primary==1 0.0077*** 0.0039** 0.0054*** 0.0028*
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Average female wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood 0.0172*** 0.0037 -0.0054 -0.0043*
(0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0025)
Average female wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood*incomplete 
primary==1 0.0102** -0.0033 -0.0011 0.0030
(0.0050) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0026)
Average male wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood 0.0041 0.0004 0.0040 0.0038**
(0.0043) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0016)
Average male wage/salary workers in 
the neighborhood*incomplete 
primary==1 0.0006 0.0052* 0.0044** 0.0002
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0014)
Results express marginal probabilities.Weighted estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Female Sample Male Sample
Urban Rural Urban Rural







Figure 1. Probability of Working as a Wage/Salary Worker as a Function 
of the Share of Wage/Salary Workers in the Neighborhood 
 
 
Note: The probability of working as a wage/worker is calculated using the results presented in column (4) of Tables 
6 to 10, using fixed effects and controls for contextual effects. The value of the average group-sample is used for all 
variables, except for the social network variable which varies. 
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Figure 2. Probability of Working as a Wage/Salary Worker as a Function of the Share 





Note: The probability of working as a wage/worker is calculated using the results presented in column (6) of Tables 
6 to 10, using fixed effects and controls for contextual effects. The value of the average group-sample is used for all 
variables, except for the social network variable, which varies. 
 